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Innocent but Incarcerated: Reforming Oklahoma’s
Criminal Pretrial Procedures to Combat Discrimination
Against Indigent Defendants
Introduction
Imagine a woman of thirty-two years of age. She works hard to make
ends meet as a single mom, working two jobs and raising her two schoolaged children. But she can be too trusting and finds herself arrested for
receiving stolen property.1 Unable to post $500 cash bond,2 let alone hire a
private attorney, she sits in the local jail while her case trudges through the
district court’s backlogged criminal docket. She loses both of her jobs and,
adding insult to injury, accrues a daily jail fee that she would unmistakably
prefer to avoid—if only she could afford to leave.
She applies for free representation through her state’s contract attorney
system and is declared indigent, but she faces a predicament once her
family manages to scrape together enough money to secure her pretrial
release. Should she allow them to post bail and risk losing appointed
counsel, or remain in jail to ensure that she receives some minimum level of
representation during pretrial proceedings and a potential trial? Faced with
two bad options, she gives up, accepting a plea deal that allows her to return
home to her kids, but at a high cost—five years of probation and a felony
record that forever alters the trajectory of her life.
While the crimes of arrest and particular circumstances vary among
cases, this scenario is all too familiar for hundreds of thousands of poor
defendants across the United States,3 and Oklahoma is no exception.
According to the most recently reported Oklahoma State Bureau of
1. See generally 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1713 (2011 & Supp. 2019) (providing for
punishment of up to eight years of incarceration upon conviction, depending on the value of
the stolen property).
2. When an individual is charged with a crime, the judge who presides over the case
generally sets a dollar amount that a defendant can pay to secure release from jail while the
case is pending. The money paid into the court is returned if the defendant attends all court
dates. If the individual cannot afford to pay the entire bail amount, they can pay a bail
bondsman a portion of the amount in exchange for the bondsman’s promise to pay the full
amount. Once the defendant attends all court dates, the bail amount is returned to the
bondsman.
3. See generally Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (explaining that nine out of ten
inmates are held in state facilities and 60% of the roughly 750,000 people held in state jails
are “innocent in the eyes of the law” having not yet been convicted).
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Investigation statistics, approximately 130,000 Oklahomans are arrested
every year, more than 111,000 of whom are arrested for non-violent
crimes. 4 Of those arrested, roughly 80% are poor enough to qualify for
court-appointed representation.5 These indigent defendants, many of whom
are already subject to unequal treatment at the hand of oppressive social and
political systems,6 receive inadequate protections in the criminal justice
system because they are poor and politically powerless. 7
Though the rights of indigent defendants are burdened at every stage of
the criminal prosecution,8 they are most vulnerable during the early stages.
Ensuring procedural fairness for the United States’ most vulnerable citizens
is paramount during initial appearances because the judge’s determination
of whether an arrestee must sit in jail for months or years pending
resolution of the case prejudices every subsequent proceeding. Criminal
justice reform advocates have long fought for widespread changes to state
bail practices, 9 and Oklahoma leaders must act decisively to curtail the
state’s swelling incarceration crisis. 10
This Comment addresses the incarceration crisis and proposes methods
for remedying disparate treatment of indigent persons by a system that was
4. OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN OKLAHOMA 2018, at 1-2–1-6 (2019).
5. See Lincoln Caplan, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-counsel-badlybattered-at-50.html; see also Christopher Zoukis, Indigent Defense in America: An Affront to
Justice, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2018/
mar/16/indigent-defense-america-affront-justice/.
6. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: M ASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (exploring the “rebirth of a caste-like system in the
United States”).
7. See Colin Warner, Justice Works in America for Those Who Can Buy It, USA
TODAY (Aug. 23, 2017, 9:05 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/
spotlight/2017/08/23/justice-works-america-those-who-can-buy/586864001/.
8. Cf. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After
‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/
03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/ (suggesting that
the right to an attorney “amounts to another unfunded mandate” because court-appointed
attorneys are “almost certainly . . . vastly underpaid and grossly overworked”).
9. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT : OFFICIAL COURT
TRANSCRIPTS OCTOBER 1961–JUNE 1962 (1962), https://www.vera.org/publications/
manhattan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-october-1961-june-1962.
10. See Nicole McAfee, ACLU Official: It’s Time to End Mass Incarceration in
Oklahoma, OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 9, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/5607524/
aclu-official-its-time-to-end-mass-incarceration-in-oklahoma.
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designed to prey upon and perpetuate their misfortunes. Part I puts the state
crisis into context, tracing the development of the American criminal justice
system and identifying national trends that contribute to over-incarceration.
Part II then discusses the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent
defendants, including how different states ensure this right. Part III
examines Oklahoma’s indigent defense mechanism and highlights
troublesome aspects that demand legislative attention. Finally, Part IV
discusses reforms that legislators and other state leaders can and should
implement.
I. Putting the Crisis in Context
To appreciate the importance of pretrial reforms, one must understand
the gravity of the United States’ current incarceration crisis along with the
underlying policies and power structures that perpetuate it. Despite
relatively consistent national incarceration rates—around 100 prisoners per
100,000 people—during the period from 1925 to 1975, the rate ballooned to
over 500 prisoners per 100,000 people by 2008. 11 By 2018, when the Prison
Policy Initiative reported that the United States incarcerates residents at five
to eighteen times the rate of other founding NATO countries, the
incarceration rate had grown to nearly 700 prisoners per 100,000 people. 12
The troubling trend toward incarcerating primarily poor people without
concern for economic, social, or other consequences is not a new
phenomenon. However, the proliferation of inmates in the American
criminal justice system has largely been caused by the confluence of four
factors: shifting beliefs concerning the purpose of criminal punishment,
criminalization of drug possession and other nonviolent activities,
continued reliance on private prisons, and changing bail policies that
impose a wealth-based test on criminal defendants’ pretrial freedom. 13

11. Data Visualization: U.S. Incarceration Rate, 1925–2008: Prisoners per 100,000
Population, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2010), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/
incarceration1925-2008.html.
12. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html. Of
the twenty-three states with incarceration rates above the national average, Oklahoma sits
atop the list at 1079 inmates per 100,000 people. Id.
13. See infra Section I.B.
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A. The Early American Criminal Justice System
Though the United States’ current status as the greatest incarcerator in
the world14 evokes a feeling of disregard for individual liberty, the creation
of its criminal justice system represented an almost altruistic step forward
in the global theory of punishment during the Age of Enlightenment. 15
Shifting attitudes concerning government and authority led intellectuals like
Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria to contemplate an ideal method of
punishment at a time when English courts punished more than 200 crimes
with death. 16 As utilitarian thinkers, they believed that punishment, albeit
necessary, should ultimately serve the greater purpose of deterring future
crime. 17 Consequently, their ideal system was one that reduced reliance on
torture and other severe penalties in favor of imprisonment. 18 To balance
the competing interests in punishing past crimes and deterring future
crimes, the systems that evolved prioritized the norms of consistency,
proportionality, and promptness.
At its inception, the American prison system was a humanitarian revolt
against draconian European traditions of criminal punishment. 19 The norms
championed by utilitarian thinkers led Pennsylvania to reform its criminal
law and substitute sentences of imprisonment for corporal punishment. 20 As
the penitentiary came to play a more important role in holding convicts, the
Pennsylvania system of prison discipline was born. 21 Under the
Pennsylvania system, prisoners convicted of serious crimes were held in
solitary confinement and only permitted to interact with guards, or the

14. See Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 12.
15. See RACHEL O’CONNOR, THE UNITED STATES PRISON SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 15–16 (2014).
16. What Was the ‘Bloody Code’?, NAT’L JUSTICE MUSEUM, https://www.nationaljustice
museum.org.uk/what-was-the-bloody-code/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020); O’CONNOR, supra
note 15, at 16.
17. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans.,
Macmillan 1986) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF M ORALS AND LEGISLATION
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789).
18. O’CONNOR, supra note 15, at 16.
19. See Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 38 (1921).
20. Id. at 48 (citing 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801,
at 280 (1906)).
21. See generally Pennsylvania System, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/Pennsylvania-system (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
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occasional visitor.22 The Pennsylvania system spread as far as Europe, but it
was plagued by exorbitant costs and concerns for its effects on prisoners’
minds.23
In response to the criticisms of the Pennsylvania system, the labor-based
Auburn system evolved at Auburn Prison in New York. 24 Under the Auburn
system, prisoners worked during the day and lived in solitary confinement
at night.25 Though this new system permitted prisoners greater human
contact during their sentences, enforced silence still prevented them from
communicating with one another.26 The Auburn system gradually replaced
the Pennsylvania system in the United States and gave rise to correctional
facilities that profit from prisoner labor.27 The Auburn system remained the
dominant system in America until the Reconstruction and Progressive eras
ushered in new reforms that sought to solve the problems of “overcrowding,
corruption, and cruelty.”28
As satisfaction with the Auburn system waned, the realities of the
criminal justice system inhibited well-intentioned reform efforts.29 More
criminals received long sentences in lieu of corporal punishment, and as a
result, prisons became overcrowded. 30 Because existing prisons endeavored
to operate as efficiently as possible with limited funding, conditions
continued to deteriorate.31 This decay led prison reformers to approach the
task of creating a better criminal justice system by looking at societal
problems through a scientific lens. 32

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Judith Anne Ryder, Auburn State Prison System, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Auburn-State-Prison (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Cf. id. (explaining that the labor-based Auburn system replaced the Pennsylvania
system).
28. O’CONNOR, supra note 15, at 22–23 (quoting THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON:
THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman
eds., 1998) (1995)).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 22 (explaining that there was overcrowding following the widespread
adoption of the Auburn system).
31. Id.
32. See The Prison Reform Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.
com/social-sciences/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/prison-reform-movement
(last
updated May 3, 2020).
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To highlight rampant inefficiencies and corruption, Enoch Wines and
Theodore Dwight published the Report on the Prisons and Reformatories of
the United States and Canada in 1867.33 The Wines and Dwight report,
along with advances in the fields of medicine and psychiatry, led to
innovations regarding probation, parole, and sentencing at the turn of the
twentieth century.34 Probation emphasized society’s interest in
rehabilitating criminals without sending them to jail and tore down the
barriers prisoners faced when reintegrating into society as law-abiding
citizens.35 Parole and sentencing changes—namely maximum sentences and
indeterminate sentencing—also helped combat the problems associated
with overcrowding by reducing the number of prisoners who continued to
serve time after reforming their behavior. 36 Together, these changes
reinforced a preference for rehabilitation and marked a shift toward
reintegration. However, they were far from perfect solutions.
During the time when state governments assumed the cost of running
prisons, these innovations transferred important functions of the criminal
justice system back to city and local authorities.37 Though probation eased
the financial burden on state prisons, its adoption shifted those costs to local
governments.38 Poor funding at the local level prevented programs from
operating with a sufficient number of probation officers.39 Furthermore,
because judges primarily gave probation to young, middle-class offenders,
poor inmates grew to comprise a greater proportion of the incarcerated
population in state facilities.40
Though state authorities implemented parole programs and indeterminate
sentencing to reduce sentence lengths, systemic flaws prevented these
promising reforms from fulfilling their intended goals. Parole boards,
tasked with reviewing inmate cases, were composed of individuals who
lacked the necessary expertise.41 These individuals’ lack of expertise,
33. See E. C. WINES & THEODORE W. DWIGHT, COMM’RS OF THE PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y.,
REPORT ON THE PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Albany,
N.Y., Van Benthuysen & Sons 1867), https://archive.org/details/reportonprisonsr00corruoft.
34. The Prison Reform Movement, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Id.; O’CONNOR, supra note 15, at 22.
37. The Prison Reform Movement, supra note 32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (noting that members of parole boards had “little expertise in analyzing inmates’
prison records and psychological profiles”).
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coupled with ever-growing caseloads, prevented them from dedicating
adequate time to individual cases. 42 Even once prisoners were released, the
parole officers that supervised compliance with various conditions faced the
same challenges. 43 As a result, many prisoners served longer sentences
under indeterminate sentencing than they would have under determinate
sentencing.44
Despite reform efforts throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, prison conditions failed to improve. 45 Growing racial tensions
spilled over into the prison environment and inflamed relations between
inmates and guards.46 Many prisoners, influenced by civil rights protesters,
demanded better treatment and living conditions in court.47 However, when
legal victories proved ineffective, riots and strikes broke out all across the
country.48 The turbulent 1960s and 1970s and rising recidivism rates led a
majority of prison reformers to take the position that efforts to rehabilitate
criminals were unsuccessful.49 Public outcry, in response to increased crime
rates and prison violence, led policymakers to abandon rehabilitative
aspirations and adopt policies that created the prison-industrial complex
responsible for today’s incarceration crisis. 50
B. Factors Contributing to the Modern Incarceration Crisis
1. Growing Public Tensions and Support for Retributive “Justice”
Though the total crime rate more than doubled in the United States
during the 1960s,51 levels of punishment remained relatively stable. 52

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. (discussing overcrowding and riots during the mid-twentieth century).
46. Id. (recognizing that “relations between prisoners and guards and between black and
white inmates grew increasingly tense”).
47. Id.
48. Id. (detailing general strikes and “dozens of riots” that broke out, including those at
the San Quentin State Prison in 1967 and at the Attica Correctional Institution in 1971).
49. See id.
50. See id. (explaining that the “tougher stance on crime that took shape” led to more
imprisonments and many new facilities).
51. See United States Crime Rates 1960–2018, DISASTER CTR., http://www.disaster
center.com/crime/uscrime.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2020) (compiling yearly population,
crime number, and crime-rate data from the FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports).
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Despite population growth of 12.3% over the period, 53 incarceration rates
fell more than 5%.54 The simultaneity of these trends led criminologist
Jackson Toby to describe criminal punishment as “a vestigial carryover of a
barbaric past” set to “disappear as humanitarianism and rationality
spread.”55 Unfortunately, Toby’s research failed to grasp the extent to
which the American public preferred punishment over rehabilitation. And
heightened social and political unrest during the Civil Rights Movement
and Vietnam War stoked the flames of discontent beyond recognition.56
The
Civil
Rights
Movement—often
called
the
Second
Reconstruction57—led to the realization of equal rights for black Americans
under the law. 58 While the nearly two-decade battle for equality brought an
end to segregation, 59 voter suppression,60 employment discrimination, 61 and
housing discrimination62 on the basis of race, it ultimately failed to remedy
the disproportionate incarceration of black Americans. 63 As implementation

52. See Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment,
64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 199 (1973) (“[I]t is not the level of actual criminal
behavior which is stable, but rather the level of punished criminal acts.”).
53. See United States Crime Rates 1960–2018, supra note 51.
54. See PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON
PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–86, at 10–11 (1988)
(indicating that the incarcerated population fell from 208,105 total state and federal inmates
on December 31, 1959 to 197,136 total inmates on December 31, 1969). When accounting
for population growth over the period, per-capita incarceration rates fell by more than 15%.
See id.; United States Crime Rates 1960–2018, supra note 51.
55. Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
332, 332 (1964).
56. See infra notes 57–71 and accompanying text.
57. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
58. Civil Rights Movement, HISTORY (Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/
black-history/civil-rights-movement.
59. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
60. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.).
61. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
62. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619).
63. See Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gapbetween-whites-and-blacks-widens/. In 1960, black Americans were five times more likely
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of equal protection laws increased competition for jobs and housing, a
phenomenon commonly referred to as “white backlash”64 took hold.65 Amid
rising crime rates and growing racial tensions, many Americans demanded
that the federal government take affirmative steps to punish lawbreakers.66
At the same time, U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War spurred protests
against the government. 67 Though opposition to the Vietnam War began on
college campuses, especially among hippies and intellectuals, 68 support for
anti-war marches and protests grew alongside burgeoning casualty counts
and war expenditures.69 Once Northern Vietnamese troops launched the Tet
Offensive70 and successfully defended against U.S. and South Vietnamese
troops, the impracticality of continued U.S. involvement turned the majority
of the American public against the war.71 Alongside rising crime rates and
growing racial tensions, anti-war protests created a social and political
environment that facilitated the federal government’s efforts to stifle dissent
by cracking down on crime.
2. The Wars on Poverty, Drugs, and Crime
In response to the growing social and political tensions that plagued the
1960s, the federal government took a more active role in crafting,
implementing, and enforcing criminal justice policy. 72 In 1964, President
Lyndon B. Johnson launched the Great Society, a series of domestic
to be incarcerated than white Americans; by 2010, that number rose to more than six times.
Id.
64. See White Backlash, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/white%20backlash (last visited Apr. 9, 2020) (defining white backlash as “the
hostile reaction of white Americans to the advances of the civil rights movement”).
65. See generally Eoin Higgins, The White Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement,
EOINHIGGINS.COM (May 22, 2014), https://eoinhiggins.com/the-white-backlash-to-the-civilrights-movement-1817ff0a9fc (reviewing literature that describes the underlying social,
economic, and political forces influencing white backlash).
66. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 105 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve
Redburn eds., 2014).
67. Vietnam War Protests, HISTORY (Feb. 22, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/
vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally Tet Offensive, HISTORY (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.history.com/
topics/vietnam-war/tet-offensive.
71. See Vietnam War Protests, supra note 67.
72. See infra notes 73–94 and accompanying text.
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programs, in response to the growing incidence of poverty and racial
injustice. 73 The so-called War on Poverty was the most ambitious and
controversial part of Johnson’s plan74 and included legislation that brought
anti-poverty programs to impoverished communities. 75 Along with antipoverty measures that attempted to alleviate poverty through job programs
and food stamps, the Great Society led to the passage of the Social Security
Act of 1965 and the resulting expansion of medical care and welfare for the
elderly and poor.76 However, the rhetoric surrounding the 1964 presidential
election shifted the national conversation from empowering marginalized
demographics to punishing lawlessness.77
After defeating Barry “crime in the streets” 78 Goldwater in the 1964
presidential election, 79 President Johnson pivoted, declaring a War on
Crime. 80 President Johnson established the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice in July 1965 to evaluate the
impact of crime on society, to improve law enforcement, corrections, and
judicial methods, and to publish a report containing findings and
recommendations.81 The resulting report, “The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society,” contained more than 200 recommendations,82 including a
73. See generally Great Society, HISTORY (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.history.com/
topics/1960s/great-society.
74. See Here & Now: ‘War on Poverty’ Remains Controversial (NPR radio broadcast
Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2014/01/08/war-on-poverty.
75. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036c).
76. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended primarily in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
77. See generally Charles Mohr, Goldwater Links the Welfare State to Rise in Crime,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/09/11/archives/goldwaterlinks-the-welfare-state-to-rise-in-crime.html.
78. See Steve Hoenisch, Crime Policy of the Republican Party, CRITICISM.COM (July 28,
2004), http://www.criticism.com/policy/republicans-crime-policy.php.
79. Michael Levy, United States Presidential Election of 1964, ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1964
(last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
80. See Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar.
20, 2015, 7:00 AM EDT), http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/.
81. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
Organization and Goals, 4 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 118, 118–19 (1966).
82. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 293–301 (1967).
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national strategy for controlling crime that led to an increase in funding and
training for police departments, prosecutors, and correctional systems. 83
The report, and its resulting expansion of the criminal justice system,
created a springboard from which President Richard Nixon’s War on
Drugs—a war that many commentators today believe America is losing, or
has already lost 84—could flourish. Nixon’s portrayal of drug addicts and
criminals as deserving of social condemnation predated his election in
1968.85 But his efforts to tie drug addiction to crime proved unsuccessful
until the simultaneous rise in recreational drug use and crime during the
1960s convinced the American public that drugs were responsible for the
problem. 86
Nixon officially declared a war on drugs in June 1971, “stating that drug
abuse was ‘public enemy number one.’”87 As a result, he increased federal
funding for drug-control agencies, proposed mandatory sentences for drug
crimes, and created new offices and agencies tasked with preventing drug
abuse.88 Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1973 to
“enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United
83. See id. at 279.
84. See, e.g., José R. Cárdenas, The United States Is Losing the War on Drugs in the
Americas, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 18, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/18/
the-united-states-is-losing-the-war-on-drugs-in-the-americas/; Misha Glenny, The War on
Drugs Has Been Lost, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c9719098964d-11e8-95f8-8640db9060a7; Ben Wallace-Wells, How America Lost the War on Drugs,
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 24, 2011, 6:44 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/politics-news/how-america-lost-the-war-on-drugs-170965/; The War on Drugs Is
Lost, NAT’L REV. (July 28, 2014, 3:07 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/07/wardrugs-lost-nro-staff/.
85. See Richard Nixon, What Has Happened to America?, READER’S DIGEST, Oct. 1967,
at 49, 49–50 (“[T]here is the indulgence of crime because of sympathy for the past
grievances of those who have become criminals. . . . Our opinion-makers have gone too far
in promoting the doctrine that when a law is broken, society, not the criminal is to blame.”);
see also United States Presidential Election of 1968, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1968 (last visited
Apr. 22, 2020).
86. See Jennifer Robison, Decades of Drug Use: Data from the ‘60s and ‘70s, GALLUP
(July 2, 2002), https://news.gallup.com/poll/6331/decades-drug-use-data-from-60s-70s.aspx
(“[I]n 1969, 48% of Americans told Gallup that drug use was a serious problem in their
community.”).
87. War on Drugs, HISTORY (May 31, 2017), https://www.history.com/topics/crime/thewar-on-drugs.
88. Id. (referencing the creation of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention
and the Drug Enforcement Administration).
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States,”89 but revelations made by Watergate co-conspirator John
Ehrlichman in a 1994 interview suggest a more nefarious intent. 90
Regardless of Nixon’s rationale for waging his war on drugs, the result has
been a catastrophic increase in incarceration that stimulated the criminal
justice system’s reliance on new facilities for housing inmates.91
The War on Drugs and other “Tough on Crime” laws passed in the 1970s
and 1980s placed an immense strain on the criminal justice system as state
and federal authorities scrambled to address the crisis of unprecedented
overcrowding.92 Chief among these “Tough on Crime” laws were
mandatory minimum sentencing, truth in sentencing, and three-strikes
laws.93 Together, these laws limited judges’ discretion to impose alternative
forms of punishment, required inmates to remain incarcerated even after
being rehabilitated, and inflicted extreme sentences for repeat offenders. 94
Fortunately for policymakers—but unfortunately for society—the market

89. History, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/history (last visited May
21, 2020).
90. See Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG.,
Apr. 2016, at 22, 22. When asked about the politics of drug prohibition, Ehrlichman
responded:
You want to know what this was really all about? . . . The Nixon campaign in
1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left
and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t
make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could
arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them
night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the
drugs? Of course we did.
Id. (quoting John Ehrlichman).
91. See Kathleen Miles, Just How Much the War on Drugs Impacts Our Overcrowded
Prisons, in One Chart, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:30 AM ET), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html
(showing that drug offenses accounted for 50.1% of federal inmates in 2014). But see
German Lopez, Why You Can’t Blame Mass Incarceration on the War on Drugs, VOX (May
30, 2017, 9:00 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/30/15591700/
mass-incarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in (discussing a new book by John Pfaff that suggests
the war on drugs’ influence on incarceration rates is overstated).
92. See supra Part I.
93. DAVID SHAPIRO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE : PRIVATE
PRISONS AND M ASS INCARCERATION 10–11 (2011).
94. Id.
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offered a promising “solution” to the growing problem of overcrowded
prisons.95
3. Private Prisons and the Prison-Industrial Complex
Though private prisons house less than 10% of state and federal
inmates,96 their continued existence imbues concerns about the future of
mass incarceration. 97 When the Obama Administration’s Department of
Justice decided to phase out private prisons for federal inmates, 98 stock
prices for the two largest private prison companies in the U.S.—Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group—fell more than 35%. 99
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates’ criticism of private facilities’
inadequate program offerings, high costs, and inferior safety and security 100
proved to be such a scathing rebuke that CCA had to change its name to
CoreCivic to distance itself from its public reputation. 101 Despite these

95. See infra notes 96–110 and accompanying text.
96. Peter Wagner, Are Private Prisons Driving Mass Incarceration?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/10/07/private_prisons_
parasite/.
97. See Carl Takei, Private Prison Giant CoreCivic’s Wants to Corner the Mass
Incarceration ‘Market’ in the States, ACLU (Nov. 7, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/smart-justice/mass-incarceration/private-prison-giant-corecivics-wants-corner-mass.
98. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Reducing Our Use of Private Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016). But see Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Rescission of Memorandum on Use of Private Prisons (Feb. 21,
2017) (rescinding the August 18, 2016 memo).
99. Christopher Ingraham, Private Prison Stocks Collapse After Justice Department
Promises to Phase Them Out, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016, 12:48 PM CDT), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/18/private-prison-stocks-collapse-after-justicedepartment-promises-to-phase-them-out/?utm_term=.f227cd7dab72.
100. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, supra note 98.
101. See Carl Takei, CoreCivic’s Practices Unchanged Despite Dropping CCA Name,
TENNESSEAN (Dec. 12, 2016, 3:52 PM CT), https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/
2016/12/12/corecivics-practices-unchanged-despite-dropping-cca-name/93907514/
[hereinafter Takei, CoreCivic].
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developments, Donald Trump’s presidency102 and industry lobbying
efforts103 have since given the private prison industry new life.
An understanding of how the industry’s continued existence threatens to
perpetuate mass incarceration in America requires some study of its
resurgence in the 1980s.104 The private prison industry as we know it today
began in 1984, when CoreCivic (then called the Corrections Corporation of
America 105) opened its first private, for-profit facility in Shelby County,
Tennessee. 106 By 1990, sixty-six more private facilities opened. 107 These
facilities capitalized on the burgeoning prison population that outpaced
state and federal facilities’ capacity to hold inmates,108 and the private
prison population grew from approximately 8,000 inmates to 129,000 over
the next twenty years.109 Unprecedented increases in incarceration rates
made this more than 1500% growth in the private prison inmate population

102. See Jeff Sommer, Trump’s Win Gives Stocks in Private Prison Companies a
Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/your-money/
trumps-win-gives-stocks-in-private-prison-companies-a-reprieve.html; Jeff Sommer, Trump
Immigration Crackdown Is Great for Private Prison Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/your-money/immigrants-prison-stocks.html.
103. See, e.g., Statement on CoreCivic’s Inducement to the State of Montana, ACLU OF
MONT. (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.aclumontana.org/en/news/statementcorecivics-inducement-state-montana.
104. Though the first modern private prison opened in 1984, it was not the first of its
kind in America. See Shane Bauer, The True History of America’s Private Prison Industry,
TIME (Sept. 25, 2018), http://time.com/5405158/the-true-history-of-americas-private-prisonindustry/ (discussing private prisons from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s).
105. In 2016, President Obama’s Department of Justice decided to phase out private
prisons for federal inmates. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, supra note 98. But see
Sessions, supra note 98 (rescinding this memo). The Administration’s 2016 memo criticized
private facilities so badly that the Corrections Corporation of America changed its name to
CoreCivic to distance itself from its soiled public reputation. See Takei, CoreCivic, supra
note 101.
106. The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA, http://www.correctionscorp.com/ourhistory (last visited May 21, 2020).
107. SHAPIRO, supra note 93, at 11.
108. Tara Joy, The Problem with Private Prisons, JUSTICE POL’Y INST . (Feb. 2, 2018),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/12006.
109. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS
OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL F ACILITIES, 1995, at iv (1997); HEATHER C. WEST ET
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 33 app.
tbl.19 (rev. 2011).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/6

2020]

COMMENTS

937

possible as state governments struggled to combat the consequences of
federal involvement in criminal punishment. 110
As reliance on private prisons grew, so too did the potential for increased
profits through lobbying efforts.111 Though the influence of the private
prison lobby varies from state to state, the industry has played a central role
in lobbying for mandatory-minimum sentencing, truth in sentencing, and
three-strike laws at the federal level. 112 Alarmingly, the three biggest private
prison companies spent a combined $22 million lobbying Congress
between 2001 and 2011.113 As state inmate populations continue to grow,
the risk of private prison lobbying poses problems on a different front—
state contracts with minimum occupancy clauses. 114
Today, twenty-eight states, including Oklahoma, still rely on private
prisons.115 While private facilities do ease the burden on overcrowded state
facilities,116 continued spending on housing inmates diverts funds that could
be allocated to reform efforts. Furthermore, minimum occupancy
agreements frequently require states to maintain anywhere from 70% to
100% occupancy at private facilities. 117 This mandate means that every new
contract—even if intended as a short-term solution to a temporary increase
in inmates—constitutes a commitment to incarcerating more individuals in
that facility over the life of the agreement. When state governments are
obligated to incarcerate a minimum number of individuals, they have a
perverse incentive to ignore legitimate justifications for criminal
110. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
111. See PICO NAT’L NETWORK & PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, UNHOLY ALLIANCE : HOW THE
PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY IS CORRUPTING OUR DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTING MASS
INCARCERATION 3 (2011).
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id. at 3.
114. See generally Joe Watson, Report Finds Two-Thirds of Private Prison Contracts
Include “Lockup Quotas”, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 31, 2015), https://www.prisonlegal
news.org/news/2015/jul/31/report-finds-two-thirds-private-prison-contracts-include-lockupquotas/.
115. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 tbl.1 (2019).
In 2017, Oklahoma housed 7353 inmates in private facilities, representing more than 26% of
its incarcerated population. Id. This statistic suggests that Oklahoma is a state where private
prison contracts still pose a substantial risk to efforts to reduce the incarcerated population.
116. See Ryan Gentzler, Private Prisons Are Bad Policy, but They’re Not to Blame for
Oklahoma’s Incarceration Problem, OKLA. POL’Y INST.: OK POL’ Y BLOG (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://okpolicy.org/private-prisons-are-bad-policy-but-theyre-not-to-blame-for-oklahomasincarceration-problem/.
117. Watson, supra note 114.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

938

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:923

punishment and fill empty beds at all costs. This dynamic has led states to
modify their bail practices in a way that categorizes criminal defendants
according to their wealth, which has become the single greatest factor in
determining whether they will be released pending trial. Despite concerns
surrounding continued reliance on private prisons, the risks that these
facilities pose to the incarceration crisis pale in comparison to the
detrimental effects of changing bail practices.
4. Changing Pretrial Policies and the Warehouse Effect
As sociopolitical tensions brewed, federal involvement in criminal
punishment became more pervasive, and private prisons injected
themselves into both federal and state criminal justice systems, the most
troubling factor underlying the modern incarceration crisis took the form of
mutating bail practices.118 After arrest and booking, a criminal defendant
typically sits in jail until a judge conducts a bail hearing. 119 At these
hearings, the judge considers whether the accused is eligible for bail and, if
so, what costs or conditions should accompany bail. 120 Judges enjoy broad
discretion in setting bail amounts and conditions and may consider an array
of factors.121 While the majority of defendants were historically released
pretrial, today, approximately 60% of defendants remain detained because
they do not receive bail or are unable to afford the amount. 122 This troubling
statistic contradicts the fundamental principle that defendants should be
released unless they pose a flight risk or danger to the community. 123
While the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, there is no
Constitutional right to bail. 124 The Bail Reform Act of 1966 created a
statutory right to pretrial release unless a particular defendant posed a flight

118. See Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ [hereinafter
Wagner, Jails Matter].
119. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT
DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 29 (2015).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Cf. TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES, 7 tbl.3 (2014)
(noting that over 60% of inmates in local jails are unconvicted).
123. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 119.
124. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987).
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risk.125 This statutory guarantee required federal judges presiding over bail
hearings to release criminal defendants without financial considerations
unless detention was necessary to prevent flight. 126 The Bail Reform Act of
1984 supplemented this framework by allowing judges to consider whether
a defendant “endanger[s] the safety of any other person or the
community”127 in addition to flight. Thus, the presumption that a defendant
should be released unless he poses a flight risk or danger was born.
However, while the Bail Reform Act of 1984 remains in effect today,
courts now impose a third condition on a pretrial release: the defendant’s
financial resources.128 This third rationale is particularly insidious when it
fails to even consider the defendant’s ability to pay. Moreover, many
jurisdictions across the country use bail schedules and assign predetermined
bail amounts based on the charged offense. 129 Though bail schedules have
recently come under fire on procedural due process grounds, 130 counties in
Oklahoma still employ them. 131 As a result of these practices, jails across
the country effectively serve as debtor’s prisons. 132
125. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (“The
purpose of this Act is to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance
to answer charges . . . when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public
interest.”). A defendant poses a flight risk when she is likely to flee the jurisdiction to avoid
criminal prosecution. The primary factors that decrease a defendant’s flight risk include
community ties through family or work. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 30.
126. See Bail Reform Act of 1966 sec. 3, § 3146(a), 80 Stat. at 214. Pretrial release
without financial conditions is commonly referred to as a personal recognizance (PR) bond.
Personal Recognizance Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.
com/p/personal-recognizance/ (last visited May 20, 2020). When a defendant is released on a
PR bond, he promises to return to court for future proceedings. Id.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) (2018).
128. See Pinto, supra note 3.
129. See, e.g., Elizabeth Marcellino, LA County Seeks Best Models for Bail Reform, NBC
4: L.A. (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:15 AM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/LA-CountyBail-Reform-505405321.html; Nick Powell, Lead Plaintiff in Galveston County Bail
Lawsuit Wants Fairer Process for Defendants, CHRON (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:56 PM CST),
https://www.chron.com/local/article/Lead-plaintiff-testifies-in-federal-lawsuit-1355
5669.php.
130. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2018); ODonnell v.
Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018).
131. See, e.g., Administrative Order: Amended Preset Bond Schedule, No. AO-2015-16
(Tulsa Cty. Dist. Ct., Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.oklahomacriminallaw.com/Tulsa_
County_Bond_Schedule.pdf. The ACLU of Oklahoma is currently challenging the use of
bail schedules in Canadian County. See Civil Rights Groups File Federal Lawsuit

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

940

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:923

Recent statistics confirm that discriminatory bail practices
disproportionately burden indigent defendants.133 Disturbingly, jail growth
has continued to rise over the past twenty years despite the convicted
population shrinking.134 And research shows that 99% of jail growth
between 1999 and 2014 stemmed from an increase in the number of pretrial
detainees. 135 This finding is especially problematic when pretrial detention
increases the likelihood that a criminal defendant will plead guilty, be
convicted, receive a sentence of imprisonment, and receive a longer
sentence. 136 Because pretrial detention poses such deleterious risks to
criminal defendants, 137 reforms that seek to address the incarceration crisis
must focus on reducing the likelihood that an indigent defendant will
receive a bail amount that she cannot afford to pay.
II. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and its Many Variants
The practices discussed above disproportionately affect poor defendants
and perpetuate a system that traps them in a cycle of poverty-induced
incarceration. 138 And while the Supreme Court has helped in one important
way—by incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel139 in
1963140—the fact that this right does not assure indigent defendants
representation at bail hearings inhibits its efficacy. 141 Despite this

Challenging Unjust Cash Bail System in Canadian County, OK, ACLU OF OKLA. (Dec. 11,
2019),
https://www.acluok.org/en/press-releases/civil-rights-groups-file-federal-lawsuitchallenging-unjust-cash-bail-system-canadian.
132. Wagner, Jails Matter, supra note 118.
133. See Pinto, supra note 3.
134. See Wagner, Jails Matter, supra note 118.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF
BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115 (2012).
137. Research shows that pretrial detention as short as three days can impact an
individual’s employment, finances, and housing as well as the wellbeing of dependent
children. Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail
Growth, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 31, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
jailsovertime.html#jailconvictionstatus (citing studies from the Crime and Justice Institute).
138. See id.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); see infra Section II.A.
140. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
141. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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shortcoming, states follow three methods—each inadequate in their own
way—for assuring the right to counsel.142
A. Incorporation Against the States
Gideon v. Wainwright was the landmark case that first guaranteed a
defendant in a state prosecution the right to counsel. 143 In Gideon, the
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 144 While this
monumental decision fundamentally changed the nature of criminal
proceedings for indigent defendants in state prosecutions, it only guaranteed
the right to counsel in felony cases. 145 Despite the narrowness of this initial
guarantee, the Court eventually extended the right to counsel to other
categories of state proceedings.146
The right to counsel now applies at state juvenile delinquency
proceedings that may result in commitment to an institution,147 for
misdemeanors that result in actual imprisonment,148 during a first appeal, 149
and at all critical stages of the prosecution.150 The right to counsel also
includes the right to decide whether to have counsel151 because defendants
have the right to represent themselves as long as they make the decision
knowingly and voluntarily. 152 It similarly includes the right to effective
counsel.153 Free representation need not be perfect, but it must be
substantially equivalent to that which would be provided by a privately
retained or appointed attorney.154 Ineffective assistance of counsel can be
grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction when the defendant proves
142. See infra Section II.B.
143. See 372 U.S. 335, 339, 344 (1963).
144. See id. at 339.
145. See id. (concluding that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated to apply against the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the right of an
individual convicted of a felony to have counsel appointed to assist him).
146. See infra notes 147–50.
147. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986).
148. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373 (1979).
149. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963).
150. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
151. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833–35 (1975).
152. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).
153. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
154. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisc., Dist. 1, 486 U.S 429, 435, 438 (1988).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

942

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:923

that the representation was objectively unreasonable and actually affected
the outcome. 155
Despite the broad application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
state prosecutions, the safeguard does not protect indigent defendants at
what may be the most important stage for innocent persons: the initial bail
hearing. 156 Although the Supreme Court mandates that states provide
indigent defendants free representation at various stages of a criminal
prosecution, state legislatures enjoy broad discretion in determining the
methods through which they ensure the right to counsel within their
jurisdictions.
B. Methods for Ensuring the Right to Counsel
There are three main models for ensuring the right to counsel for
indigent defendants: assigned counsel, contract systems, and public
defender programs.157 Under the assigned counsel model, courts assign
private attorneys to cases on an ad hoc or systematic basis.158 Under the
contract model, private attorneys, groups of attorneys, bar associations, or
nonprofit organizations agree to represent some or all of the indigent
defendants in a given jurisdiction for a specified period.159 Under the public
defender model, public or private nonprofit organizations employ staff
attorneys and support staff to manage the indigent defense cases within a
given jurisdiction on an ongoing basis. 160 Although none of these methods
guarantee indigent defendants representation at the initial appearance, their
relative benefits and shortcomings help elucidate opportunities for
legislative and judicial reform.

155. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–92 (1984).
156. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE CTR. FOR COURTS, PRETRIAL JUSTICE BRIEF NO. 7, ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL RELEASE PROCEEDINGS 1 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court
“left open whether a proceeding at which the decision is made to release or detain a
defendant pending trial qualifies as one of these critical stages at which counsel must be
present”).
157. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the
United States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32 (1995).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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1. Assigned Counsel
The ad hoc assigned counsel model is the oldest form of providing
indigent defendants with the right to counsel. 161 Under this model, courts
appoint attorneys without regard for a set rotation or list of qualification
criteria.162 For example, if an indigent defendant appears at a pretrial
proceeding, the judge might look out into the courtroom, call an attorney to
the bench, and assign the case to that attorney. Attorneys assigned in similar
manners are usually paid an hourly rate, but they may receive a flat fee per
case.163 This is among the most commonly employed methods across the
country, especially in small, less-populated counties.164
The coordinated assigned counsel model is similar to the ad hoc model,
except that these types of programs operate under the direction of an
administrative or oversight body. 165 These programs typically require
minimum qualifications before attorneys may participate, and cases are
assigned on a rotational basis according to the attorney’s area of expertise
and case complexity. 166 Compensation structures are similar to those
employed under the ad hoc model, but this system helps ensure counsel’s
independence from the judiciary and higher standards of representation. 167
2. Contract Systems
The first type of contract system is the fixed-price contract system
whereby attorneys, groups of attorneys, bar associations, or nonprofit
organizations accept undetermined numbers of cases for a flat fee. 168
Contracting attorneys are generally responsible for all costs related to
investigation and securing expert witnesses.169 While contract prices are
based on an estimated caseload, if the number of cases exceeds the
projected amount, the contracting attorney, or group of attorneys, is
responsible
for
providing
representation
without
additional
compensation.170
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
Id.
See id.
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The ABA has condemned the use of fixed-price contracts for providing
indigent defense services,171 and the Arizona Supreme Court has even
declared them unconstitutional. 172 The Arizona Supreme Court cited the
following reasons for prohibiting use of fixed-price contracts: (1) failure to
take into account the time that attorneys spend representing indigent
defendants, (2) failure to provide support costs for contracting attorneys, (3)
failure to “take into account the competency of the attorney” providing
indigent defense services, and (4) failure to “take into account the
complexity of each case.”173 In September 2006, the Washington Supreme
Court prohibited fixed-price contracts that require attorneys to bear the cost
of investigation or securing expert witnesses, because they “involve an
inherent conflict between the interests of the client and the personal
interests of the lawyer.”174 This decision came after the ACLU of
Washington brought a class-action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants
represented by Grant County’s contracted public defense attorneys. 175
The fixed-fee-per-case contract is a less common version of the contract
method whereby attorneys, groups of attorneys, bar associations, or
nonprofit organizations agree to represent indigent defendants in “a
predetermined number of cases for a fixed fee per case.”176 This system is
far less common than the fixed-price contract system, mostly because the
associated costs are higher.177 However, where the fixed-fee-per-case
system has been implemented, it has led to higher-quality representation. 178
ABA Standards favor these systems over fixed-price systems and require
contracts to include, among other items, the following pieces of
information: (1) type and number of cases, (2) fee per case, (3) attorney
qualification standards, and (4) names of attorneys who will be working on
the cases. 179
171. Id.
172. Arizona v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
173. Id.
174. See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 27 (2015).
175. See Settlement Revamps Grant County, Washington Indigent Defense System;
County Agrees to $1.1 Million in Attorney Fees, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2007),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2007/jan/15/settlement-revamps-grant-countywashington-indigent-defense-system-county-agrees-to-11-million-in-attorney-fees/.
176. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 34.
177. See id. at 35.
178. See id.
179. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE : PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES 13, 49–50 (3d. ed. 1992).
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3. Public Defender Programs
The final method for ensuring the right to counsel at the state level
involves a public defender program, which “is a public or private nonprofit
organization staffed by full- or part-time attorneys” who represent all
indigent criminal defendants within a given jurisdiction. 180 While programs
vary, the common characteristic underlying all public defender systems is
the employment of staff attorneys.181 The public defender concept existed in
the early 1900s but became increasingly popular in the aftermath of Gideon
v. Wainwright.182 And by 2013, public defender systems closed at least 60%
of cases handled by state indigent defense systems. 183
Public defender systems are popular in larger jurisdictions that can afford
to pay staff attorneys and professional staff, but operational costs tend to
rise over time as caseloads expand.184 The result is that public defenders,
like those working within the fixed-price contract system, often carry heavy
caseloads that complicate the task of providing effective representation to
all clients who require indigent defense services. 185 Because conflicts of
interest often arise when one organization defends all indigent criminal
defendants within a particular geographic area, these systems often operate
alongside an assigned counsel or contract system. 186
III. Oklahoma’s Indigent Defense Framework
A. The Two-Pronged Approach
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to counsel. 187 Since 1978, Oklahoma law has
permitted city governments with populations of 200,000 or more to create
an office of public defender to protect the rights of any defendant charged

180. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 36.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE-ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013, at 3 tbl.1 (rev. 2017) (showing
that, in 2013, public defenders closed roughly 1.65 million out of 2.70 million indigent
defense cases in twenty-eight states plus the District of Columbia).
184. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 36.
185. Id. at 36–37.
186. Id. at 36.
187. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20.
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with violating any ordinance, upon the order of any criminal judge. 188 As of
1995, counties with populations of at least 300,000 automatically have an
office of public defender to “protect[] . . . the rights of any defendant to a
criminal action.”189 For cities and counties with insufficient populations,
indigent defense work is provided under the Indigent Defense Act. 190
1. Public Defender
Only two counties satisfy the population requirements under titles 11 and
19 to establish an office of public defender: Oklahoma County and Tulsa
County.191 The Oklahoma County Public Defender and Tulsa County
Public Defender offices provide the following categories of representation
for indigent defendants: misdemeanors, felonies, capital crimes, juvenile
defense, domestic, civil commitment, and child advocacy—including trial
and appellate work.192 Manned with attorneys, investigators, and
professional support personnel, county public defender offices provide
representation to criminal defendants who are too poor to hire a private
attorney. 193
Defendants who request representation by a public defender must, under
oath and penalty of perjury, apply and pay a nonrefundable $15 application
fee.194 A court will not accept an application that is not accompanied by the
fee, unless the court decides to waive the fee after determining that the
applicant is in custody or lacks the financial resources to pay. 195 If the
defendant requests representation after being released on bond, the
application must include a statement certifying that the applicant has
contacted three licensed attorneys and has been unable to obtain private
counsel.196 The court sends a copy of each application to the prosecuting
attorney for review and will, upon request, require a hearing before
declaring a defendant indigent and thus eligible for appointment of a public
188.
189.
190.
191.

11 OKLA. STAT. § 28-110 (2011).
19 OKLA. STAT. § 138.1a(A) (2011).
See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355(C) (2011).
See POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT
POPULATION : APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2018 (2018).
192. Public Defender, OKLA. CTY., https://www.oklahomacounty.org/169/PublicDefender (last visited May 21, 2020); What We Do, TULSA CTY. PUB. DEFS., http://tulsa
publicdefender.net/tulsa-county-public-defender/ (last visited May 21, 2020).
193. See 19 OKLA. STAT. § 138.5(A) (2011 & Supp. 2019).
194. Id. § 138.5(B).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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defender.197 If a defendant has posted bond, other than by recognizance, the
court may consider that fact in determining eligibility for appointed
counsel, as long as such payment of bond is not the sole factor in
determining whether an applicant is indigent. 198
2. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System
Following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Oklahoma v.
Lynch,199 the Oklahoma Legislature passed the Indigent Defense Act (the
Act) to expand indigent criminal defendants’ access to counsel.200 The Act
created the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS)201 and the
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Board (the Board). 202 Under the Act,
the Board is tasked with governing OIDS.203 The Act also established the
process for determining whether a defendant is indigent204 and identified
the scope of proceedings for which indigents receive representation.205
The application process for representation under OIDS is similar to that
for representation by a county public defender 206 but is governed by rules
promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals.207 Like individuals applying
for representation by a county public defender, individuals applying under
the Act must disclose information pertaining to financial status, the
possibility of family assistance, and bond status under oath and penalty of
perjury. 208 Like individuals who have posted bond before applying for
representation by a public defender, OIDS applicants must include a written
statement certifying that they have contacted three licensed attorneys and
197. Id.
198. Id. § 138.5(C).
199. 1990 OK 82, 796 P.2d 1150.
200. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355(B) (2011).
201. Id.
202. See id. § 1355.1.
203. Id.
204. See id. § 1355A.
205. See id. § 1355.6(A) (guaranteeing representation in capital cases, felony cases,
misdemeanor and traffic cases punishable by incarceration, “juvenile delinquency
proceedings, adult certification proceedings, reverse certification proceedings, youthful
offender proceedings,” and other cases pursuant to the Oklahoma Juvenile Code); see also
id. § 1355.6(B) (giving the Executive Director the power to approve representation in other
state proceedings when the “representation is related to the case for which the original
appointment of the System was made” if the Act does not otherwise prohibit it).
206. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
207. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355A(B)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2019).
208. See id. app. § XIII, form 13.3.
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have been unable to obtain private counsel.209 Furthermore, courts similarly
send a copy of all applications to the prosecuting attorney and, upon request
by any party, will hold indigency determination hearings. 210 If applicants
post bond, other than by recognizance, the court may consider that fact in
determining eligibility for appointed counsel, as long as such payment of
bond is not the sole factor in determining whether an applicant is
indigent. 211 Unlike applicants seeking representation by a public defender,
those applying under the Act must pay a $40 application fee. 212 However, if
the court determines that the applicant lacks financial wherewithal, the
court may defer the fee until conviction. 213
Pursuant to the Indigent Defense Act, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals promulgated Rule 1.14 to establish the factors that courts should
consider when determining an applicant’s indigency status.214 The court
elected to follow the guidelines set forth in Cleek v. Oklahoma,215 In re
Humphrey,216 and Bruner v. Oklahoma.217 Thus, an applicant’s indigency
determination depends on consideration of the following factors:
1. Ability and decision to post appeal bond;
2. Availability of liquid assets;
3. Debts and liabilities;
4. Financial history;
5. Income potential and living expenses;
6. Credit standing;
7. Family size and number of dependents; and
8. Ability and willingness of family members to provide financial
assistance. 218
209. Id. § 1355A(A).
210. Id. § 1355A(C).
211. Id. § 1355A(D).
212. Id. § 1355A(A).
213. Id.
214. See OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14(A)(1).
215. 1987 OK CR 278, ¶ 5, 748 P.2d 39, 40, overruled on other grounds by Norton v.
Oklahoma, 2002 OK CR 10, 43 P.3d 404.
216. 1979 OK CR 97, ¶ 14, 601 P.2d 103, 108.
217. 1978 OK CR 65, ¶ 7, 581 P.2d 1314, 1317–18.
218. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14(A)(1).
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Consulting these factors, the Chief Judge, or the Chief Judge’s designee,
determines whether the applicant is indigent and thus eligible for
representation by OIDS.219 Once an applicant has been declared indigent,
the case will be handled by an attorney appointed on a coordinated
assignment basis220 or by the attorney, or group of attorneys, who has
secured the contract to represent indigent criminal defendants and indigent
juveniles in a given jurisdiction for a certain period. 221
Contracts for noncapital trial representation are available annually and
become open for bidding should the previous holder elect not to renew an
existing contract for the next fiscal year, or should the Board elect to solicit
new offers.222 When the Board decides not to renew a contract, the
Executive Director publishes a notice in the Oklahoma Bar Journal inviting
offers for the upcoming year.223 Such notice must include information
regarding attorney qualifications, the contract period, and a description of
services to be rendered.224 Members of the Oklahoma Bar Association in
good standing are eligible to bid on contracts,225 and the Board accepts the
best offer (or offers) after considering the following factors:
1. “Whether the attorney or attorneys submitting the offer maintain
an office within th[e] county”;
2. Whether the office is the attorney’s or attorneys’ primary office;
3. Whether the attorney or attorneys have a contract in another
county;
4. Whether the attorneys included in the offer can handle the cases
to be covered; and
5. The accessibility of the attorney or attorneys to clients requiring
representation.226
Contracts awarded under the Act are fixed-price contracts,227 but cases
assigned under the coordinated assignment program or not otherwise
219. Id.
220. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.6(C) (2011).
221. See id. § 1355.8 (providing a framework to award contracts for representation of
indigent criminal defendants).
222. Id. § 1355.8(A).
223. Id. § 1355.8(B).
224. Id. § 1355.8(B)(2)–(4).
225. Id. § 1355.8(C).
226. Id. § 1355.8(D)(1)(a)–(e).
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covered by a fiscal year noncapital trial contract follow a fixed-fee-per case
arrangement.228 Assigned cases are subject to statutory maximums that vary
depending on the type of case.229
B. Consequences of Oklahoma’s Two-Pronged Approach
1. Surface-level Benefits
Oklahoma’s indigent defense system was designed to be as cost-effective
as possible. 230 Public defender systems enjoy economies of scale by
employing dedicated legal, investigative, and support staffs to serve
indigent persons in high population areas like Oklahoma City and Tulsa.231
Public defender offices lend themselves to the division of labor, which
facilitates more productive operations. While growing caseloads may
threaten public defenders offices’ ability to provide the same quality of
service to a broader client base, specialized organizations are better
positioned to respond to increased demands at only marginally higher
costs.232
Similarly, the predominantly fixed-price contract system that OIDS
employs makes it cheaper to provide services in less populated areas.233
Where a solo practitioner or small practice can manage an entire city or
county’s caseload, as small-town criminal defense attorneys may
sometimes do, it may not make sense to establish a bureaucratic system.
Additionally, awarding the majority of cases through fixed-price contracts
helps keep costs down and appropriations predictable. Once the Board
awards contracts for a given fiscal year, OIDS can project, with an aboveaverage degree of certainty, what its yearly expenses will be. However,

227. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text.
229. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.8(F) (establishing a maximum compensation of $3500
for felony cases and $800 for other cases, subject to Executive Director and Board approval
of additional compensation in exceptional cases that require “extraordinary amount[s] of
time to litigate” and for which a “request for extraordinary attorney fees is reasonable”).
230. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, STATE OF OKLA., https://www.ok.gov/OIDS/
(last visited May 21, 2020).
231. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
232. See Ivillegas, City Controller: Public Defender Provides Most Cost-Efficient Means
of Representing Poor, S.F. PUB. DEF. (June 24, 2009), http://sfpublicdefender.org/
news/2009/06/city-controller-public-defender-provides-most-cost-efficient-means-ofrepresenting-poor/.
233. See supra notes 219–21.
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these cost savings negatively affect the populations they were created to
serve, to the detriment of every arrested indigent.
2. The Human Cost of Prioritizing Efficiency over Equity
Despite—or perhaps because of—the economic incentives that motivate
the current system, Oklahoma has constructed an indigent defense
apparatus that suffers from all the negative consequences that the ABA
seeks to discourage in its suggested standards. 234 The most egregious
characteristic is that the system relies heavily on fixed-price contracts to
provide indigent defense services in 97% of Oklahoma counties.235 While
fixed-price contracts may help keep expenditures under control, they
substantially limit the quality of service that the most vulnerable criminal
defendants receive.
The fixed-price contract system creates perverse incentives that place the
interests of attorneys directly at odds with those of their clients. 236 Because
contract attorneys earn a flat monthly rate regardless of the time that they
dedicate to each case, they lack an incentive to provide their clients with
significant representation. Instead, the system’s incentive structure
encourages cutting corners on research and writing and negotiating plea
deals in cases that should not be plead out. As a result, indigent clients
receive inferior representation that falls short of the constitutional guarantee
of effective counsel.
Fixed-price contracts also negatively affect the attorneys who represent
clients under their terms. By inadvertently encouraging attorneys across the
state to provide lower quality services, the OIDS system exposes attorneys
to an increased risk of grievances and sanctions by the Oklahoma Bar
Association. Furthermore, requiring attorneys to manage caseloads that far
exceed national recommendations and ABA standards diminishes their
ability to be proud of their work and confidence that they are doing all they
can for every client.237 These economic and emotional consequences
contribute to attorney burnout, reducing the supply of individuals with the
training, skill, and passion for representing indigent clients.
234. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.
237. See Andrew Cohen, The Most Overworked, Underfunded ‘Army’ in American
History, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/
07/the-most-overworked-underfunded-army-in-american-history/277363/ (discussing the
emotional consequences of overburdening public defenders).
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IV. Proposed Reforms
Since the Prison Policy Initiative released its 2018 statistics that
recognized Oklahoma as the leading incarcerator in the world,238 Oklahoma
has made limited progress toward reducing the incarcerated population. 239
In May 2019, the Legislature passed HB 1269.240 The bill made SQ 780, a
2016 ballot initiative which made simple drug possession a misdemeanor
instead of a felony, retroactive. 241 HB 1269 also created the Pardon and
Parole Board, which was tasked with reviewing commutation applications
by individuals serving sentences for simple possession. And on November
4, 2019, 462 Oklahomans were released in the largest single-day
commutation in U.S. history.242
Unsurprisingly, this measure overwhelmingly favored individuals with
the financial resources to hire an attorney to complete an application on
their behalf. 243 And, as a criminal justice analyst at the Oklahoma Policy
Institute recognized, “For Oklahoma, the preferred solution to almost any
infraction [remains] incarceration.” 244 Notwithstanding the passage of HB
1269, the Oklahoma Legislature has failed to pass any meaningful criminal
justice bills since the state first gained its reputation as the leading
incarcerator in the world.245 And in its 2020 budget request, the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections included $884 million to build 5200 new beds in

238. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
239. See Bret Shulte, Oklahoma Focuses on Criminal Justice Reform, U.S. NEWS (Oct.
31, 2019, 8:41 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-10-31/
oklahoma-focuses-on-criminal-justice-reform.
240. See Damion Shade, HB 1269 Makes 780 Retroactive But Leaves Issues Unresolved,
OKPOLICY.ORG.: OKLA. POL’Y INST. (May 23, 2019), https://okpolicy.org/hb-1269-makes780-retroactive-but-leaves-issues-unresolved/.
241. See id.
242. See Joshua Bote, Hundreds of Oklahoma Inmates to be Freed, The Largest Mass
Release in US History, USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2010, 10:09 AM ET), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2019/11/04/hundreds-oklahoma-inmates-released-largestcommutation-history/4154598002/.
243. See Shade, supra note 240.
244. Shulte, supra note 239 (quoting Damion Shade, criminal Analyst for Oklahoma
Policy Institute).
245. See Quinton Chandler, Legislators Leave Criminal Justice Reform Bills on the Table
as Prison Population Grows, STATEIMPACT OKLA. (May 30, 2019, 3:18 PM),
https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2019/05/30/legislators-leave-criminal-justice-reformbills-on-the-table-as-prison-population-grows/.
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its facilities that were operating at over 110% capacity.246 The lack of
political will to pass measures that help the most vulnerable criminal
defendants and never-ending desire to increase facility capacity reinforces
the need for pretrial reforms that actually address the crux of the
incarceration issue: the criminalization of poverty and eagerness to prey
upon the misfortunes of indigent persons.
Although it may be enticing to operate state government in a way that
decreases spending on social services,247 indigent defense deserves to be
adequately funded and systematically reformed in ways that restore the
dignity of the poorest and most vulnerable citizens. If criminal justice
systems are judged by how effectively they deliver justice to their most
vulnerable citizens, Oklahoma’s is failing miserably. The following reforms
address pretrial proceedings in ways that, if implemented together, would
provide indigent criminal defendants with higher quality representation,
reduce prison and jail populations, and disrupt powerful systems of
oppression that perpetuate poverty and criminality. These reforms also
illustrate that the Oklahoma Legislature has an arsenal of tools at its
disposal if it actually wants to address the state’s ongoing incarceration
crisis.
A. Replace the Fixed-Price OIDS Contract System with a Statewide Public
Defender Program
First, the Oklahoma Legislature should abandon the fixed-price contract
system that incentivizes attorneys who provide indigent defense services to
allocate minimal time and resources to individual cases. 248 While assigned
counsel programs dominated the indigent defense landscape in the lead up
to the landmark decisions in Gideon and Argersinger,249 public defender
systems became commonplace in metropolitan areas following the Supreme
Court’s sweeping mandate. 250 But even as metropolitan areas increasingly
246. Oklahoma Board of Corrections Approves State System 2020 Budget Request,
OKLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS (Oct. 30, 2018), http://doc.ok.gov/oklahoma-board-ofcorrections-approves-state-prison-system-2020-budget-request.
247. Cf. Matt Grossmann, Republican Control in the States Hasn’t Stopped the Growth
of Government, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 10, 2019, 11:33 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.
com/features/republican-control-in-the-states-hasnt-stopped-the-growth-of-government/
(explaining that Republication legislators often promise to avoid expanding social services).
248. See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text.
249. See AM. BAR ASS’N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CONCERNING FIXED PRICE
CONTRACTS FOR REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 1 (1996).
250. Id.
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adopted public defender models, rising costs threatened their desirability,
and legislatures across the country—especially those responsible for
implementing programs that saved money in smaller, rural jurisdictions—
shifted toward contract systems like OIDS in the 1970s.251 But the growing
number of indigent defendants requiring appointed counsel limits the
effectiveness of contract systems that prioritize cost savings. 252 The
national—and Oklahoma—trend toward prioritizing cost savings over
judicial efficiency and high-quality indigent defense services bolsters
concerns about whether indigent defendants receive constitutionally
adequate representation.253 Chief among these concerns is that emphasizing
cost will lead to lower-quality services.254
In 2015, the ACLU of Idaho sued the state over “its unconstitutional
system of public defense, which deprive[d] thousands of Idahoans of their
Sixth Amendment right to adequate legal representation.”255 The classaction suit challenged the state’s combination public defender and fixedprice contract system. 256 The Idaho system, analogous to that in Oklahoma,
operated with such inadequate resources that indigents who sued the state
received bail amounts that they could not afford, spent weeks or months in
jail, and lacked access to investigative help.257 Though the Idaho
Legislature passed the Public Defense Act in 2014 to ban fixed-price
contracts, nineteen out of forty-four counties still used fixed-price contracts
at the time the suit was filed. 258 Although the trial court originally dismissed
the lawsuit in January 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed in 2017 and
allowed the case to proceed. 259
251. See id.
252. See id. at 1–2; CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT NO. NCJ 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
2–3 (2000).
253. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 35.
254. See id.
255. Leo Morales, ACLU Sues Idaho Over Defective Public Defense System, ACLU OF
IDAHO (June 17, 2015, 9:15 AM), https://www.acluidaho.org/en/news/aclu-sues-idaho-overdefective-public-defense-system.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. See Bill Dentzer, ACLU Sues Idaho for Lack of Action to Fix ‘Broken’ Public
Defender System, IDAHO STATESMAN (June 17, 2015, 9:10 AM), https://www.idaho
statesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article40864158.html.
259. Tucker, et al. vs. State of Idaho, et al., ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/tucker-etal-vs-state-idaho-et-al (last updated Nov. 27, 2019). “The case is currently back on appeal in
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While the Idaho commission tasked with adopting new standards and
implementing new procedures following the prohibition on fixed-price
contracts failed to deliver, the Oklahoma Legislature should follow suit by
banning fixed-price contracts. Banning these contracts may require
reforming the entire OIDS system and, in turn, allocating more taxpayer
money to indigent defense, but doing so would increase the quality of
indigent defense services by removing contradictory incentives that pit
providers against receivers. While abandoning the fixed-price contract
system would allow the Legislature to alter the underlying incentive
structures that prevent indigent defendants from receiving adequate
representation, such a reform does not go far enough to address Oklahoma’s
unparalleled incarceration crisis.
B. Provide Indigent Defendants with Counsel at Bail Hearings
The Oklahoma Legislature should also consider recognizing bail
hearings—sometimes called initial appearances—as critical proceedings.
Doing so would ensure the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at indigent
defendants’ first appearance before a judge. 260 Having appointed counsel
present at bail hearings would ensure that those who are most susceptible to
sit in jail pending trial have a chance to argue in favor of reduced or
recognizance bond. While determinations of what constitutes a critical
proceeding have historically occupied the province of the judicial branch,
the Oklahoma Legislature possesses the authority to decide matters of
public policy concerning the availability of defense counsel for indigent
defendants at pretrial proceedings.261
Should the Legislature be unwilling to act, the courts could also
guarantee indigent defendants counsel at bail hearings. Though the
Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies at a bail hearing, it came close in
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas.262 In Rothgery, an indigent sued a
Texas county for refusing to appoint him a lawyer until six months after his
the Idaho Supreme Court—this time to determine the proper legal standard to be used in this
case and in public defense reform cases more generally.” Id.
260. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967).
261. As an example of this legislative authority, the Indigent Defense Act has a provision
that allows indigents to be represented in other state proceedings (such as pretrial
proceedings) not specifically enumerated within the Act upon approval by the Executive
Director. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.6(A)–(B) (2011).
262. 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
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initial appearance. 263 The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
attached at the initial appearance but did so without deciding whether a bail
hearing is a critical stage. 264 Consequently, the Court failed to mandate that
the right to counsel attaches at or before the bail hearing, as opposed to
after the bail hearing.
However, in the time since Rothgery, the New York Court of Appeals
and Connecticut Supreme Court have determined that bail proceedings are
critical stages that require the presence of counsel. 265 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court should follow suit and declare that the importance of the
assistance of counsel at proceedings where courts may impose potentially
prohibitive bail amounts justifies granting the right to counsel at initial
appearances. Doing so would help propel a national trend toward
guaranteeing counsel at bail hearings while contributing to ending the
practice of incarcerating poor individuals before they have even been
proven guilty. Should the Oklahoma Supreme Court choose not to interpret
the Sixth Amendment how the New York and Connecticut courts did, it
could accomplish the same outcome within the state using article 2, section
20 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which guarantees a state right to
counsel.266 Though guaranteeing indigent criminal defendants the right to
counsel at bail hearings will reduce the number of individuals who spend
prolonged periods in jail awaiting trial, it will not address the issue as
effectively as rectifying the bail system at large.
C. Mandatory Recognizance Bonds for Nonviolent Crimes
While guaranteeing the right to counsel at bail hearings would reduce the
likelihood that an indigent is incarcerated, wholly eliminating cash bond for
nonviolent crimes would eliminate the need for counsel at such hearings in
more than 80% of cases.267 Jurisdictions across the country are beginning to
implement similar reforms to limit the extent to which the criminal justice
system punishes indigent defendants for their financial misfortunes. 268
263. Id. at 196–97.
264. See id. at 213.
265. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. 2010); Gonzalez v.
Comm’r of Corr., 68 A.3d 624, 635–36 (Conn.), cert. denied, 751 U.S. 1045 (2013).
266. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 (protecting the “[r]ights of accused in criminal
cases”).
267. See OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 1-2 (showing that
nonviolent crimes accounted for roughly 85% of reported index crimes in Oklahoma in
2018).
268. See infra notes 269–80 and accompanying text.
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Reform efforts in Georgia, Illinois, and New York offer blueprints that the
Oklahoma Legislature could consider in reducing its reliance on a wealthbased test for determining pretrial release.
In February 2018, Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms signed an
ordinance that eliminated cash bond requirements for certain low-level
offenses.269 The ordinance gives the Atlanta Detention Center authority to
release individuals charged with nonviolent misdemeanors or city ordinance
violations on their own recognizance. 270 Though the state bail-bond
industry opposed the measure, the Atlanta City Council voted 13-0 in
favor.271 When asked about the ordinance, Mayor Bottoms replied, “There
are poor people who don’t have resources to get out of jail . . . it ma[kes] no
fiscal sense to hold someone who cannot post a $500 bond at a cost to
taxpayers of thousands of dollars.”272 Fulton County, where Atlanta is
located, also passed an ordinance that eliminated cash bail for violations of
county ordinances and certain misdemeanors.273 According to Robb Pitts,
Chairman of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners, the change will
save the county seventy-seven dollars per day per inmate.274 Based on
Oklahoma’s estimated 4000 inmates who are held in jails pretrial despite
not yet being convicted, 275 an estimated 80% of whom committed
nonviolent crimes, such a change could amount to nearly $250,000 in
savings per day.
In May 2015, the Illinois Legislature passed Senate Bill 202, which
guarantees that defendants “accused of nonviolent crimes such as
trespassing,” will be released without bond if their case lasts thirty days or
269. See Keith Whitney, Atlanta, Fulton County Looks to Eliminate Cash-Bonds for NonViolent, Minor Crimes, CBS 46 [ATLANTA] (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.cbs46.com/news/
atlanta-fulton-county-looks-to-eliminate-cash-bonds-for-non/article_e9d70c4c-3614-55f38d35-c39270b5b7ce.html.
270. Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail System in
a Nod to the Needy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.myajc.com/news/local/
atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-the-needy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtg
BN/.
271. Id.
272. Id (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms).
273. Carson Cook, Fulton Passes Measure to Ease Bail Requirement, N. FULTON (Oct. 8,
2018), https://www.northfulton.com/news/fulton-passes-measure-to-ease-bail-requirement/
article_251ee1d2-cb5c-11e8-8e75-bfbce99237ae.html.
274. Whitney, supra note 269.
275. See Oklahoma Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
profiles/OK.html (last visited May 20, 2020).
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longer. 276 Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, who proposed the bill, asserted,
“These folks are nonviolent, not dangerous. They are in here because of
inertia built into a large system.” 277 By releasing defendants who cannot
afford to post bond after thirty days, Cook County stands to save $143 per
day per inmate. 278 If Oklahoma were to adopt a similar policy, using the
same numbers as above, 279 this could lead to more than $450,000 in daily
savings. In July 2016, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio launched a
program that released approximately 3400 of the city’s inmates under a
monitored supervision program.280
Oklahoma stands to benefit significantly should it choose to implement a
similar system for nonviolent offenses. While bail is not supposed to be
imposed as a punishment, 281 it often becomes punitive when imposed
against indigent criminal defendants.282 Requiring individuals to remain in
jail because they cannot afford to purchase their temporary freedom goes
far beyond the government interest in ensuring appearance at court dates
and serves no legitimate purpose. For example, in Washington, D.C., most
criminal defendants are released on recognizance bonds, yet the city still
boasts “an 89% court appearance rate.”283 Reliance on outdated cash bail
practices serves no other purpose than to criminalize and perpetuate poverty
among those classes of individuals who are most susceptible to it. However,
if the Oklahoma Legislature truly wants to address the state’s incarceration
crisis and remedy the injustices being effectuated against the state’s poorest
citizens, it should go even a step further.
D. Abolish Cash Bail Entirely
Finally, the Oklahoma Legislature should abolish cash bail entirely.
While this proposition may sound like an excessive step to take in
implementing criminal justice reform, it gets to the root of the issue that
indigent criminal defendants face when they find themselves at a bail
hearing. Rather than conditioning one’s freedom on wealth, systems that
276. Fiona Ortiz, Poor, Nonviolent Inmates Benefit from U.S. Bail Reform Push,
REUTERS (July 16, 2015, 10:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chicago-bailidUSKCN0PQ1UN20150716.
277. Id. (quoting Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart).
278. Id.
279. Oklahoma Profile, supra note 275.
280. Ortiz, supra note 276.
281. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
283. Ortiz, supra note 276.
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reject the premise of the cash bail system treat bail hearings as they were
intended.284
In August 2018, “California . . . became the first state to fully abolish
cash bail.”285 The California Money Bail Reform Act286 ensured that
suspects accused of crimes “will be evaluated on the basis of risk to public
safety and the likelihood of not appearing in court, rather than on his or her
ability to post a certain bail amount.”287 Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice
of the California Supreme Court, lauded the law as “a fair and just solution
for all Californians.”288
Under the new system, the California Judicial Council, tasked with
setting state court rules, would create a new system for assessing suspects
as “low risk,” “medium risk,” and “high risk.” 289 Courts would be able to
detain suspects “if there is a substantial likelihood that no condition or
combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure
public safety or the appearance of the person in court.”290 While supporters
claimed that the law would end wealth-based discrimination in the setting
of bail, opponents feared that it gave courts too much power.291
Natasha Minsker, Director for the ACLU of California Center for
Advocacy & Policy,292 worried that the new statute “lacks protections
against racial bias.”293 Some legislators also expressed concerns that the
state rushed to pass a bill involving complex issues that deserved more
time. 294 The Essie Justice Group feared that the law “gives too much
discretion to prosecutors” and may lead to “incarceration without any due
process.”295

284. See supra notes 124–27.
285. Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/california-cash-bail.html.
286. S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
287. Fuller, supra note 285.
288. Id. (quoting Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court).
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting the law itself).
291. Id.
292. Natasha Minsker, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/natasha-minsker-7742
7019 (last visited May 21, 2020).
293. Fuller, supra note 285 (quoting Natasha Minsker, advocate for California ACLU).
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting statement from Essie Justice).
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Unfortunately, the California bail bill has been put on hold pending a
referendum in November 2020.296 Following the law’s passage in 2018, a
national coalition of the two-billion-dollar bail lobby organized a
referendum drive and gathered enough signatures to put the issue to a
vote.297 Despite this setback, the bill’s original author is confident that the
voters will approve the measure.298 In the meantime, at least eleven counties
are experimenting with pilot programs to reduce the number of people in
jail, and approximately fifty counties have started using risk assessment
tools to determine which defendants qualify for release. 299
Though the California Legislature may have rushed the legislation
without taking time to work through all the details, Oklahoma can change
the way its criminal justice system works by passing similar legislation.
Thankfully, Oklahoma could convene a task force to study the California
county pilot programs and risk assessment tools to determine which ones
mitigate risks that opponents of California’s bill raised. A new risk-based
system that only considers risks of flight and public safety would reduce the
likelihood that indigent criminal defendants are unjustly jailed for minor
crimes. And with the power of hindsight, the Oklahoma Legislature could
also address those areas that the California bill failed to consider.
To limit the courts’ and prosecutors’ discretion, the Oklahoma
Legislature could enumerate certain crimes for which detention should be
mandatory. Such a system would result in mandatory pretrial detention for
certain individuals who might otherwise be eligible for release on a sizable
bond, but it would be a step in the right direction by basing pretrial
detention on the offense charged rather than the defendant’s financial
resources. If the purpose of pretrial detention is to limit risks of flight and
danger to public safety, it should be reserved for individuals who pose such
risks, not those who are simply too poor to afford their freedom.
Conclusion
Oklahoma’s incarceration crisis is part of a national trend, not an isolated
occurrence.300 Despite the regularity with which states construct and
296. See Jazmine Ulloa, California’s Historic Overhaul of Cash Bail is Now on Hold,
Pending a 2020 Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019, 7:25 PM), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum-20190116-story.html.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/6

2020]

COMMENTS

961

administer two-tiered criminal justice systems that criminalize poverty,
Oklahoma’s system deserves special attention. The state’s status as the
highest incarcerator per capita in the entire world301 makes it an ideal
candidate to implement comprehensive reforms.
Though cost savings have historically driven legislative and executive
decisions regarding the administration of the state’s indigent defense
system, continued reliance on the same policies will only serve to aggravate
the incarceration crisis. The only sensible way to address Oklahoma’s
broken system is to reform the pretrial policies that disproportionately
impact the most vulnerable criminal defendants—those who are too poor to
afford to get out of jail. While criminal justice reforms that will reverse the
troubling trends toward relentless incarceration may require initial
expenditures in the form of increased appropriations for indigent defense,
the state stands to offset many of its short-term costs in the long term.
Each of the proposed reforms will produce an economic benefit once its
effects are realized. 302 Ending fixed-price contracts may increase short-term
costs for statewide indigent defense services, but higher quality
representation will reduce the costs associated with incarcerating innocent
defendants for crimes they did not commit. 303 This is true during both the
pretrial stage and post-conviction. Reducing the number of beds occupied
by innocent indigents will save city and county governments funds, and
reducing the number of individuals who plead guilty to crimes they did not
commit will do the same for the state government. Better representation
would ensure that prosecutors give guilty defendants access to information
that helps reduce the length of their sentences, and it will also make it less
likely that an innocent indigent either pleads guilty or gets convicted at
trial. Ensuring the right to counsel at bail hearings may cost judicial
resources on the front end but would simultaneously reduce the strain on
overcrowded jails. Eliminating cash bail—either for nonviolent crimes or
all crimes—may raise pretrial supervision costs but would significantly
curtail spending on pretrial detention.

301. Matt Clarke, Oklahoma Is Number One ... in Incarceration Rates, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/feb/5/oklahoma-numberone-incarceration-rates/.
302. For example, Georgia and Illinois saved $77 and $143 per inmate per day,
respectively, through their reform efforts. See supra notes 274, 278.
303. Cf. Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 157, at 35 (explaining that contract
programs for representing indigent defendants sacrifice quality for low cost).
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These proposed reforms, whether implemented individually or together,
would reduce the strain on overcrowded prisons and jails. They would also
save taxpayer funds that would otherwise be spent on incarcerating poor
criminal defendants. Though the exact short-term financial costs are
difficult to predict, the long-term financial and societal benefits of
reforming pretrial procedures far exceed any such expenditure. Finally—
and perhaps most importantly—these reforms would help restore the
dignity of the most vulnerable individuals in the criminal justice system and
send a clear signal that our legislators truly care about all citizens, not just
the wealthy.
Bailey Betz
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